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Abstract 
The pollution haven hypothesis suggests that unilateral domestic emission mitigation 
policies could cause adverse “competitiveness” impacts on domestic manufacturers as 
they lose market share to foreign competitors and relocate production activity – and 
emissions – to unregulated economies.  We construct a precise definition of 
competitiveness impacts appropriate for climate change regulation that can be estimated 
exclusively with domestic production and net import data.  We use this definition and a 
20+ year panel of 400+ U.S. manufacturing industries to estimate the effects of energy 
prices, which is in turn used to simulate the impacts of carbon pricing policy.  We find 
that a U.S.-only $15 per ton CO2 price will cause competitiveness effects on the order of 
a 1.0 to 1.3 percent decline in production among the most energy-intensive 
manufacturing industries.  This amounts to roughly one-third of the total impact of a 
carbon pricing policy on these firms‟ economic output. 
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I. Introduction 
  The debate over climate change policy has largely focused on the design of 
instruments that will impose a price on the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases.  In the context of this debate, attention has turned to the prospect that 
policy instruments such as cap-and-trade and emission taxes could cause adverse 
competitiveness effects for energy-intensive firms in developed countries, such as in 
Western Europe and the United States, if they move forward with mitigation efforts while 
major developing countries postpone action.
1  The concerns about competitiveness are 
consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis that suggests that firms relocate economic 
activity from high regulatory cost to low regulatory cost countries.   
While sometimes framed as a “jobs versus the environment” question with regard 
to conventional pollution (Morgenstern et al. 2002), this effect is especially troubling in 
the context of climate change policy.  The relocation of economic activity would increase 
CO2 emissions in developing countries, thereby undermining the global environmental 
benefits of the developed country's emission mitigation policy.  That is, it is a “jobs and 
the environment” problem.   
In this paper, we present evidence that the competitiveness impacts of carbon 
pricing would reduce production by about 1 percent, representing a small share – perhaps 
one-third – of the overall impact of recent climate proposals on energy-intensive 
industries.  To draw these conclusions, we begin with a formal definition of adverse 
competitiveness effects, a definition that is frequently unclear in existing studies.  We 
                                                   
1 A variety of energy and climate policies could cause adverse competitiveness impacts by raising the cost 
of using fossil fuels, including state cap-and-trade programs (such as in California and the northeastern 
states), state renewable and alternative energy mandates in the power sector, and greenhouse gas regulatory 
mandates under the Clean Air Act. 2 
 
then derive an estimable expression for this definition and use data to calculate the effect 
for a unilateral U.S. emission mitigation policy on the U.S. manufacturing sector.  Here, 
we employ a somewhat novel empirical strategy that examines the historical relationship 
between energy prices and production and consumption in the U.S. manufacturing sector.  
Taking advantage of the fact that market-based CO2 policy instruments such as cap-and-
trade and emission taxes operate primarily by raising energy prices, we use this 
estimation to infer the competitiveness effect of U.S.-only CO2 regulation.   
Our approach uses idiosyncratic, within-industry energy price variation to identify 
the competitiveness effect defined in our theoretical section below.
2  This is akin to 
estimating the various elasticities used to run computable general equilibrium models that 
have yielded previous economy-wide competitiveness and emission leakage estimates, 
except that we generate results in a reduced-form regression framework of equilibrium 
outcomes at a much more disaggregated level (4-digit industry).  In particular, through 
interaction terms, we allow the estimated effects to vary with the energy intensity of 
production, allowing us to differentiate impacts among more or less energy-intensive 
industries. 
  Our estimated model in hand, we simulate the impacts of a U.S.-only $15 per ton 
CO2 price, translated into the likely changes in energy prices.  We focus on $15 per ton 
CO2 because the energy price changes are consistent with the observed variation in our 
historic energy price data; $15 per ton is also in line with prices expected under various 
cap-and-trade and carbon tax legislative proposals in recent years. 
                                                   
2 As discussed below, we focus on consumption and production, rather than net imports directly for 
econometric reasons. 3 
 
We find that the higher energy prices associated with this carbon price would lead 
to a production decline of between 3 and 4 percent among key energy-intensive sectors 
(e.g., iron and steel, aluminum, cement, etc.).  We also find, however, that this energy 
price increase would cause a 2 to 3 percent decline in consumption (defined as production 
plus net imports).  The decline in consumption reflects efforts to economize on the use of 
energy-intensive manufactured commodities in end-use products and substitution to less-
energy-intensive input (more below).
3  This suggests that an emission mitigation policy 
would induce a roughly 1 percent shift in production overseas -- our estimated adverse 
competitiveness effect.  Put another way, as a share of the total 3 to 4 percent effect on 
production, the “competitiveness” component is only about one-third. 
More broadly across the manufacturing sector, there is an interesting pattern.  
Supply declines less for less energy-intensive goods -- but always declines.  Demand, 
however, rises for the least energy-intensive goods, reflecting the substitution noted 
above.  For these less energy-intensive industries, the competiveness effect can actually 
be larger than the supply effect (net imports rise by more than supply declines).  Put 
another way, the energy-intensive firms that have remained in the United States may be 
more resilient to energy price shocks than some of the less energy-intensive firms who 
actually see demand for their products rise.   Quantitatively, the overall results suggest 
the competitiveness effects associated with a $15 per ton CO2 price is consistently around 
1 percent, a shift suggesting that relatively small effect (compared to annual fluctuations) 
to industry at the price levels we can study.
4 
                                                   
3 These estimated impacts may also reflect the limits to the capacity of foreign firms to supply more of 
these goods at a given price in the short run. 
4 To put the 1 percent competitiveness impact in context, the absolute value of the annual real percentage 
change in the value of shipments in the manufacturing sector averaged 8.8 percent during our sample.  4 
 
  Our work builds on a substantial literature that has examined the more general 
question of whether environmental regulations adversely affect the competitive position 
of American industry.  Numerous theoretical analyses have suggested that environmental 
policy could create so-called “pollution havens” in developing countries: 
“The conventional wisdom is that environmental regulations impose 
significant costs, slow productivity growth, and thereby hinder the ability 
of U.S. firms to compete in international markets.  This loss of 
competitiveness is believed to be reflected in declining exports, increasing 
imports, and a long-term movement of manufacturing capacity from the 
United States to other countries, particularly in „pollution-intensive‟ 
industries” (Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 133). 
  
  Empirically evaluating this conventional wisdom has proven challenging (Jaffe et 
al. 1995; Levinson and Taylor 2008).  A variety of factors may mitigate or dominate the 
effect of environmental regulatory costs in determining manufacturing location decisions.  
First, the availability of relevant factors of production, such as appropriately skilled labor, 
natural resources, and capital, can play a more significant role than pollution control costs 
(Antweiler et al. 2001).  Second, transportation costs may discourage relocation to 
countries far from the major markets for manufactured goods (Ederington et al. 2005).  
Third, firms with a significant share of their investments in large, fixed physical 
structures also appear to move activity less in response to environmental regulations 
(Ederington et al. 2005).  Fourth, proximity to firms that produce inputs or purchase 
outputs – e.g., agglomeration economies – also discourages relocation (Jeppesen et al. 
2002).   
                                                                                                                                                       
Some energy-intensive industries, such as iron and steel and aluminum, experienced annual percentage 
changes on average in excess of the manufacturing sector average.  Other energy-intensive industries, 
including chemicals, paper, cement, and bulk glass, experienced annual percentage changes in value of 
shipments in the 5.6 to 8.0 percent range, on average.  5 
 
  Since the most pollution-intensive industries tend to be relatively immobile by 
these measures of “footlooseness,” the empirical literature typically finds quite limited 
impacts of environmental regulations on international competitiveness.  Recent research 
by Levinson and Taylor (2008) shows that U.S. pollution abatement costs in the 1970s 
and 1980s increased net imports in the manufacturing sector from Mexico and Canada.  
The estimated increase in net imports roughly equaled about 10 percent of the total 
increase in bi-lateral trade for both Mexico and Canada, suggesting that other factors 
played much more substantial roles in the evolution of trade among the North American 
trading partners.  An extensive literature on the competitiveness effects of variation in 
environmental policies across the U.S. states has shown more significant impacts on 
domestic firm relocation resulting from variation in the stringency of environmental 
regulations (Henderson 1996; Greenstone 2002).  Recent work by Kahn and Mansur 
(2010) finds even larger effects looking at adjacent counties.  The larger domestic 
competitiveness impacts may reflect the fact that labor costs and availability of capital do 
not vary much across the U.S. states and counties, and transportation costs are less 
important, relative to the international context. 
  This empirical literature has focused on retrospective analyses of U.S. 
environmental regulations.  The absence of a domestic CO2 regulatory or taxation regime 
precludes us from taking exactly the same approach.  The popular alternative has been to 
use applied computable general equilibrium models to simulate potential competitiveness 
impacts of pricing carbon (IPCC 2001).  While informative, this approach suffers from 
assumed rather than estimated parameters and insufficient detail to break out differences 
in behavior or results among industries with different energy intensities.  Indeed, it is 6 
 
typical to make a common set of assumptions that yield a common response across the 
entire manufacturing industry to a carbon pricing policy.  As our analysis shows below, 
this approach can underestimate the impacts on the more energy-intensive manufacturing 
industries.  Furthermore, these CGE models focus on aggregate estimates of emission 
leakage, not effects on individual industries.    
  To motivate our empirical analysis, the next section presents an analytical model 
of the competitiveness impacts of environmental regulations – particularly the case of 
climate change, where we distinguish between the absence of foreign regulation (where 
global coordination on a regulatory regime is the benchmark) versus the presence of 
domestic regulation (where zero regulation is the benchmark).  Section three presents our 
empirical methods and data.  Then we present the results of our empirical analyses of the 
relationships between energy prices and production and consumption.  Section five 
illustrates the results of our simulation of a near-term unilateral U.S. CO2 mitigation 
policy on the U.S. manufacturing sector.  The final section concludes with comments on 
future research and implications for policy design. 
 
II. Definition of the Competitiveness Effect 
  In order to define the competitiveness effect, we have to consider the benchmark 
or counterfactual where we presume there is no such effect.  Studies of the 
competitiveness impacts of conventional local pollution regulation usually examine the 
effect of domestic regulation against a static, largely unregulated, environment.  That is, 
the counterfactual is no regulation anywhere.  However, an effective international climate 
change effort will require significant regulation by all countries.  Recent studies show 7 
 
that even reducing developed countries‟ greenhouse emissions to zero by 2050, will not 
be sufficient for global attainment of moderate mitigation goals if developing countries 
take no action (Blanford et al 2009).  For this reason, we employ an assumption of 
comparable regulation in all countries as our climate policy benchmark.  That is, we ask 
what happens when a particular country acts when everyone should be acting, versus 
conventional studies that ask what happens when a particular country acts against a 
backdrop of no one acting. 
From a U.S. perspective, this benchmark means we need to distinguish between 
the effects on U.S. manufacturing associated with U.S.-only regulation versus a global 
CO2 pricing regime.  Global regulation would still cause a shift in production towards 
less carbon-intensive products and processes, with a corresponding decline in those 
products and processes with high emissions.  If U.S. and foreign firms face comparable 
CO2 pricing policies -- effectively ensuring a so-called level playing field with respect to 
climate policy -- then any decline in production in carbon-intensive U.S. firms would not 
be considered a competitiveness effect.  The true notion of a competitiveness effect is 
therefore the difference between this outcome and what happens to U.S. firms with U.S.-
only regulation. 
  To further elaborate this definition, consider a simple model of market 
equilibrium: 
 
(1)        ,, US FOR D p S p r NI p r   
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where D(p) is domestic demand as a function of domestic market price p, S(p, rUS) is 
domestic supply as a function of domestic market price p and domestic regulation rUS, 
and NI(p,rFOR) is foreign supply (net imports) as a function of domestic price p and 
foreign regulation rFOR.  We make the standard assumptions that Dp < 0, Sp > 0, NIp > 0, 
Sr < 0, NIr < 0 (that is demand is downward sloping, supply and net imports are upward 
sloping, and regulation increases costs). 
  Now imagine a global climate regime that increases rUS to  US US US r r r      for 
domestic producers and rFOR to  FOR FOR FOR r r r      for foreign producers.  Taking the 
total derivative of (1), we can solve for the change in price under global regulation, p0: 
 
(2)     
      FOR p US p p
FOR FOR r US US r
r p NI r p S p D
r r p NI r r p S
p
, ,
, ,
0  
  
   
 
This implies a corresponding change in domestic supply associated with global regulation 
S0:  
 
(3) 
   
 
         
        FOR FOR r
FOR p US p P
US P
US US r
FOR p US p P
P
US p US US r
r r p NI
r p NI r p S p D
r p S
r r p S
r p NI r p S p D
p D
p r p S r r p S S

 
 
 

    
,
, ,
,
,
, ,
, , 0 0
 
 
Note that the sign of expression (3) is ambiguous: the first term is negative and the 
second positive.  Unless foreign regulation has a larger effect than domestic regulation on 9 
 
the domestic market, the net effect will be negative. This is shown graphically in Figure 
1, where the left panel shows domestic supply and demand and the right panel shows net 
imports.  p0 is the vertical change in price, and S0 the horizontal change in supply, 
associated with global regulation.  The horizontal lines across the two panels reflect the 
equilibrium prices, with and without regulation, where net imports equal the difference 
between domestic demand and supply.  While the general case is ambiguous, Figure 1 
shows the (conventional) negative effect on domestic supply from global regulation. 
  Assuming rʹFOR and rʹUS are considered appropriate responses under a global 
climate agreement, we would not look at the decline S0 as a competitiveness effect.  
That is, it does not represent an adverse effect on U.S. firms arising from the absence of 
regulations abroad.  So where is the competitiveness effect?  Now consider what happens 
if there is no foreign regulation.  From (2), we have a price change from U.S.-only 
regulation of p1: 
 
(4)   
    ) , ( ,
,
1
FOR p US p p
US US r
r p NI r p S p D
r r p S
p
 

   
 
and a domestic supply change from U.S.-only regulation of S1: 
(5) 
   
 
      US US r
FOR p US p P
P
US p US US r
r r p S
r p NI r p S p D
p D
p r p S r r p S S

 

    
,
) , ( ,
, , 1 1
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This is shown graphically in Figure 2, where the right panel again shows net imports and 
the left panel shows domestic supply.  p1 is the vertical change in price, and S1 the 
horizontal change in supply, now associated with U.S.-only regulation. 
  Given the second term in Equation (3) is positive, we know that S1 < S0 and the 
difference is negative: 
 
(6)   
     
  FOR FOR r
FOR p US p P
US P r r p NI
r p NI r p S p D
r p S
S S 
 
     ,
, ,
,
0 1  
 
This is what we define as the competitiveness effect (CE) – the equilibrium difference in 
domestic supply owing to the absence of foreign regulation.  In Figure 2, where a small 
circle on the x-axis indicates supply with global regulation from Figure 1, this difference 
is labeled CE. 
  Given this relates to the absence of foreign regulation, not surprisingly, we can 
understand this expression as the negative of the effect of foreign-only regulation on 
domestic supply (e.g., compare to Equation (3)).  This is the “missing” element when the 
U.S. acts alone to regulate a global pollutant associated with goods that compete in a 
global market, absent comparable actions by other nations.  While this measure depends 
on events abroad – notably the vertical shift in net imports, NIr(p,rFOR)rFOR – it is 
fundamentally about the effect on U.S. firms. 
  In the context of empirical analysis, if our data allowed us to construct a proxy 
measure of foreign regulation, we could quantify this reduced-form effect directly.  We 
could estimate the coefficient on foreign regulation in a regression with domestic 11 
 
production as the regressand and both domestic and foreign regulation as the regressors 
(e.g., Equation (3)).  The product of this foreign regulation coefficient estimate and a 
value of the absent foreign regulation would yield our measure of a competitiveness 
effect from comparable U.S.-only regulation.  Unfortunately, such data are not available 
and, instead, we are confronted with the question of how we might estimate this effect in 
(6) with primarily domestic data. 
  One possibility is to focus on the effect of U.S.-only regulation on net imports.  
This has intuitive appeal – it appears to be the shift overseas of production, emissions, 
and jobs, arising from U.S. regulation that fuels the rhetoric over competitiveness in the 
first place – even if we know it is not exactly correct.  From above, this measure equals: 
 
(7) 
 
        US US r
FOR p US p p
FOR p r r p S
r p NI r p S p D
r p NI
NI 
 
  ,
, ,
,
1    
 
How does this relate to the true competitiveness effect in (6)?  We can rewrite the two 
expressions (6) and (7) as: 
 
(8) 
   
     
 
  
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
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





 
    
FOR p
FOR FOR r
FOR p US p P
FOR p US P
r p NI
r r p NI
r p NI r p S p D
r p NI r p S
S S
,
,
, ,
, ,
0 1  
 
and 
 
(9)     
     
 
  





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


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



 
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where the first term is opposite in sign but otherwise the same in both expressions and the 
second term equals the (negative of the) vertical supply shift associated with regulation in 
foreign (8) and domestic (9) markets (the change in supply divided by the dq/dp slope).  
Therefore, the effect of domestic regulation on net imports will reflect the true 
competitiveness effect to the extent the marginal cost increase is the same for domestic 
and foreign producers.  A larger cost increase for foreign producers means we 
underestimate the competitiveness effect; a smaller increase for foreign producers means 
we overestimate the competitiveness effect.  Figures 1 and 2 show the case where these 
vertical shifts are the same and the change in net imports with U.S.-only regulation equals 
the true competitiveness effect. 
  We believe it is reasonable approximation to assume that domestic and foreign 
climate change regulation should have comparable impacts on the marginal costs of 
production for domestic and foreign manufacturers.  First, it is likely that governments 
will implement policies that deliver comparable carbon prices.   This may reflect a 
harmonized carbon tax, as some economists have advocated (Cooper 2007, Nordhaus 
2007).  It could reflect the linkage of domestic emission mitigation policies that result in 
a common clearing price in tradable allowance markets (Jaffe and Stavins 2010).  It could 
also reflect implicit price coordination among nations as they develop and implement 
their domestic emission mitigation policies (Pizer 2007).  The threat of imposing a carbon 
tax on imports from unregulated foreign producers may also induce regulatory 
convergence across nations.    13 
 
  Second, comparable carbon prices would likely yield comparable increases in the 
marginal cost of production in the manufacturing sector.  The energy-intensity of 
manufacturing is fairly similar by industrial activity across developed countries.  Given 
the extensive investment in new manufacturing capacity in China over the past decade, 
the characteristics of the production technology in China are approaching those of the 
developed world – particularly those destined for competitive export markets.  For 
example, the energy intensity of advanced cement manufacturing in China exceeds the 
average international advanced cement manufacturing intensity by less than 6 percent 
(Tsinghua University of China 2008).  The energy intensity of blast-oven furnace steel 
manufacturing in China is a few percentage points better than that of the United States, 
although U.S. electric arc furnace technology still requires less energy than Chinese 
plants (Hasanbeigi et al. 2011). 
  In the event that cost increases from a notion of equitable global regulation do 
differ significantly across nations, then our measures would yield a biased estimate.  If 
foreign producers have lower marginal compliance costs, then the price increase from 
foreign regulation would be lower and the expression (7) would provide an overestimate.  
If foreign producers have higher marginal compliance costs (e.g., suppose an identical 
carbon price across nations raises production costs more in Chinese manufacturing 
because of higher energy intensities), then the larger foreign cost increase suggests (7) is 
an under-estimate of the competitiveness effect in (5).  In the end, we believe that, to a 
first order, cost increases are likely to be similar, and our use of net import effects from 
U.S.-only regulation should provide a reasonable estimate of the true competitiveness 
effect.   14 
 
 
III. Methods and Data for Empirical Analysis 
  We are ultimately interested in a reduced-form estimate of the impact of U.S. 
regulation on net imports in Equation (9), e.g. the coefficient on regulation in a regression 
with net imports on the left-hand side.   We do not directly estimate a net imports 
regression, however, because of the large variation in industry size and the variation in 
the sign of net imports in our data (which prevents a direct log transformation).  We 
considered two possible alternatives: (1) estimating separate regressions in logarithms for 
domestic supply and demand, then looking at differences in relevant coefficients, and (2) 
estimating one regression using net imports as a share of domestic supply (which has 
been the traditional approach in the literature).  Given NI = D – S, the relationship among 
these various approaches and the implied derivative of net imports (with respect to 
regulation R) can be expressed as: 
(10)   
 
  
   
    
    
    
    
      
  
   
    
    
          
      
  
   
    
  
 
where ∂NI/∂R is the derivative of net imports – what we really care about, (∂lnD/∂R – 
∂lnS/∂R) is the difference between the derivatives of logged demand and logged supply – 
the estimate using approach 1, and ∂(NI/S)/∂R is the derivative of net imports as a share 
of domestic production – the estimate using approach 2.   
Both approaches, examining ∂NI/∂R via consideration of (∂lnD/∂R – ∂lnS/∂R)  or 
∂(NI/S)/∂R, slightly misrepresent what we really care about, ∂NI/∂R.  This error is small 
when net imports as share of domestic production (NI/S) is small, something true for 75 
percent of the industries in the sample (where we define small as ±15 percent).  While the 
results for these industries are similar using either approach, the first approach using 15 
 
(∂lnD/∂R – ∂lnS/∂R) can be corrected easily as we have an estimate of ∂lnD/∂R.  In 
addition, the second approach breaks down when there are observations with S very small 
compared to NI, leading to unusually large swings in NI/S for small changes in domestic 
production, something that arises for 5 industries (where NI>2S) in our sample and 
requires those industries to be dropped with the second approach.  For that reason, we 
focus on the first approach using (∂lnD/∂R – ∂lnS/∂R) and consider the corrected 
estimates in Table 2 that presents the results of our carbon pricing simulation below. 
Having chosen the basic approach, we estimate a two-equation system of 
regressions using a sample of more than 400 U.S. industries at the 4-digit industry (SIC 
1972) level of disaggregation over the 1974-1994 period.  The basic regression 
specification takes this form of reduced-form estimates of a system of domestic supply 
and demand: 
 
(11)  itk it k k it US tk ik itk X r f Y            ) ; ( ,    
 
where  itk Y  represents the measure for outcome k – the natural logarithm of supply and 
demand measures (S and D in equations (1-10)) for industry i and year t; the  ‟s are 
fixed effects for industries (i), and years (t);  it US r ,  represents the level of U.S. “regulation” 
– the natural logarithm of the average electricity cost in 1987 dollars as discussed below; 
it X  is a vector of additional determinants of the industry outcome measures, including 
average industry tariffs and factor intensity variables (to estimate the returns to human 
capital and physical capital).   16 
 
  The two-equation system of regressions permits correlation in the residuals, a 
factor that must be included when we calculate our net import effect with parameters 
from both equations using a seemingly unrelated regression framework.  In addition, we 
correct the standard error estimates to control for industry-specific heteroskedasticity.       
Energy prices serve as a proxy for the impact of a carbon pricing regime because 
cap-and-trade programs and carbon taxes both would raise energy prices.  In turn, we use 
electricity prices as our primary measure of energy prices because electricity 
expenditures represented a majority of energy expenditures for 88 percent of all 
manufacturing industries in our sample.  It is also an informative index of fossil fuel 
prices, since all three types of fossil fuels are used to generate electricity in our sample.  
In any case, we were unable to construct industry-specific price measures for other fuels.
5   
It is also worth noting that our use of energy prices as a proxy for regulatory 
stringency circumvents a number of problems noted in the empirical pollution haven 
literature, which typically use the ratio of regulatory compliance costs to value added as a 
proxy for the stringency of environmental regulations.  Levinson and Taylor (2008) note 
that changes in production levels can affect this ratio of pollution abatement cost 
expenditures (PACE) to output and create an endogeneity problem.  Production levels 
change this regulatory cost burden measure directly, as production or a related variable is 
the denominator of the PACE share.  Production levels can also change the numerator of 
the PACE share indirectly, as changes in production affect plant turnover, scale 
economies, and the difficulty in meeting regulatory standards – all of which affect 
                                                   
5 The NBER-CES manufacturing industry database provides data on electricity expenditures and quantity 
of electricity consumed that allows us to construct an annual average electricity price by industry.  The 
Annual Survey of Manufactures collected only energy expenditures data, not quantities or prices of energy, 
for all other fuels. 17 
 
regulatory compliance costs.   In contrast, energy prices are unlikely to be endogenous to 
individual industry production decisions.  
Finally in our specification, industry fixed effects capture time-invariant 
characteristics of industries that may affect these measures of competitiveness and year 
fixed effects account for common shocks, such as those from monetary policy, world oil 
prices, etc. that affect all industries in a given period of time.  Thus, identification is 
premised on idiosyncratic, within-industry electricity price shocks, typically driven by 
utility- and region- specific changes over time related to where industries are located.   
  We consider various forms for the relationship             between U.S. 
regulation (e.g., electricity prices) and our left-hand side variables, ranging from a simple 
linear function of energy prices to flexible functions that allow the energy price 
elasticities across industries to vary based on each industry‟s average energy intensity 
over the relevant sample period.  We ultimately settle on a flexible cubic-spline approach, 
although we introduce the results in the next section with simpler approaches to provide 
context and motivation for the cubic spline.  Intuitively, higher energy intensities imply 
larger cost impacts from rising energy prices.  Viewed through the lens of carbon dioxide 
regulation, the very high positive correlation between energy consumption and carbon 
dioxide emissions implies that energy intensity is effectively a carbon pollution intensity 
measure.  Thus, a carbon pricing regime that imposes a common marginal cost on 
emissions will result in heterogeneity in the compliance costs per unit of output across the 
manufacturing sector.  Flexible estimation of the supply and demand elasticities as a 
function of this “pollution intensity” allows us to capture this effective compliance cost 
impact. 18 
 
  We use the value of shipments by industry from the NBER-CES manufacturing 
dataset developed by Bartlesman et al. (2000) as our measure of domestic supply.
6  We 
define demand (consumption) as domestic supply (production) plus net imports, which 
we construct from the NBER trade database developed by Feenstra (1996).  As noted 
above, we undertake our analysis with these supply and demand measures in logarithms 
because of the significant variation in size of U.S. manufacturing industries.  We define 
energy intensity as the ratio of all energy expenditures to value of shipments (constructed 
from the Annual Survey of Manufactures, multiple years and Bartlesman et al. 2000).  
For each industry, we calculate the average intensity over 1974 to 1994, as well as sub-
samples for 1974-1985 and 1986-1994 as discussed in the next section.   Figure 3 
presents the cumulative distribution function for industry average energy intensity over 
1986-1994. 
  We constructed electricity prices from NBER-CES data on electricity 
expenditures and quantity of electricity purchased.
7  We also control for average industry 
tariff rates, the physical capital share of value added, and the human capital share of 
value added, consistent with Ederington et al.‟s (2005) analysis of the impacts of 
domestic environmental regulation on net imports.  The average tariff is expressed in 
percentage points, and represents the average industry-level tariff based on the total 
duties collected multiplied by 100 scaled by total customs value (constructed from data 
provided by Magee and Feenstra et al. 2002).  The physical capital share is represented 
by one minus the ratio of total payroll to value added (constructed from data provided by 
Bartlesman et al. 2000).  The human capital share is calculated as total payroll minus 
                                                   
6 All measures of output, net imports, and prices have been deflated to constant 1987 dollars. 
7 We thank Wayne Gray for providing data for 1978. 19 
 
payments to unskilled labor, scaled by industry value added.  Payments of unskilled labor 
are estimated from the Current Population Survey as the number of workers, multiplied 
by average annual income of workers with less than a high school diploma (constructed 
from U.S. Bureau of the Census, and Bartlesman et al. 2000).  For constructing a 
consistent dataset, we employed several concordances made available by Jon Haveman.   
  Let us explain why we abridge our sample at 1994.  Our import data comes from 
Feenstra (1996), which provides us with U.S. bilateral trade by 4-digit SIC through 1994.  
These data require transformation due to differences between the import-based SIC codes 
(MSIC) and domestic-based SIC codes.  Essentially, a number of SIC codes are defined 
by processing methods, and this information is unknown for imports.  Feenstra 
overcomes the differences in SIC and MSIC using a weighting matrix derived from data 
in the U.S. Census Bureau‟s “U.S. Commodity Imports and Exports as Related to 
Output.”  The Census Bureau notes that this publication was “discontinued because of a 
significant decrease in the Census Bureau's budget in 1996 and the conversion of the SIC 
to the new North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) starting with the 
1997 production data.”  Since our average tariff rate and consumption data are derived in 
part from these import data, we cannot reasonably extend our sample beyond 1994. 
 
IV. Empirical Estimates of the Effects of Electricity Prices on Domestic Supply and 
Demand 
  To provide context and motivation for our preferred flexible regression 
specification, we first present simplified results for the domestic supply and demand 
models with and without linear interactions between energy price and the historic energy 20 
 
intensity of the industry.  Without the interaction, this is akin to previous papers that 
regress domestic supply and/or net imports on the level of environmental compliance 
costs or on the ratio of environmental compliance costs to the value of shipments.  In 
both cases, we allow for the effect of the electricity price to vary between the 1974-1985 
and the 1986-1994 time periods.  We establish this distinction to account for the impacts 
of the period of higher energy prices (1974-1985) on fuel switching (as the utility sector 
switched from petroleum to coal in power generation in the late 1970s and early 1980s) 
and on investments in more energy efficient capital in the manufacturing sector.  The 
more recent period may also better characterize the potential impacts of a carbon pricing 
regime on the manufacturing sector.   
The left half of Table 1 shows results without including energy intensity and is 
comparable to previous work,  for example Levinson and Taylor (2008), Ederington et al. 
(2005), and Grossman and Krueger (1991).  In each of these three papers, the ratio of net 
imports to value of shipments is regressed on the ratio of pollution abatement costs to 
value of shipments (or value added), as well as other controls that enter the regression 
equation linearly.  The estimated supply and demand elasticities with respect to 
electricity prices are quite small, with the supply elasticities about -0.1.  We cannot 
statistically distinguish the 1974-1985 supply elasticity from the 1986-1994 supply 
elasticity.  The demand elasticities, interestingly, are statistically significant but the latter 
period has a positive sign.  Our more flexible regression specifications (both the right half 
of Table 1 and Figure 5 below) reveal a pattern where, in response to higher energy 
prices, demand rises for less energy-intensive products while demand for more energy-
intensive products declines.  A model that restricts the response to be the same across all 21 
 
industries, however, ends up being weighted toward the (more numerous) less energy-
intensive sectors; hence the positive sign.   
Following the supply and demand estimates, we present the difference, 
representing the effect on net imports and, in turn, the potential competitiveness effect.  
Note that the standard error of the difference is considerably smaller than the standard 
errors of the separate estimates; this reflects significant positive error correlation across 
the supply and demand equations.  During the 1974-1985 period, this specification 
suggests the reverse of a competitiveness effect; higher domestic energy prices lead to a 
modest decline in net imports.  In the 1986-1994 period, we see a more conventional 
estimate suggesting net imports rise with higher domestic energy prices. 
As noted, we expect the response to vary across industries based on energy 
intensities.  The right half of Table 2 shows a simple attempt to capture this with the 
average energy intensity of each industry (calculated separately for the two sub-periods) 
interacted with the electricity price.  The result is as we would expect:  industries with 
higher energy intensity see more negative supply and demand responses.  Both 
interactions are highly significant.  When we take their difference to compute the 
competitiveness effect, however, the significance vanishes.  A simple linear relationship 
between the price elasticity and energy intensity is inadequate.   
This motivates our use of a cubic spline specification for the relationship between 
price elasticity and energy intensity.  We specify that the dependency of the energy-price 
coefficient on energy intensity follow a restricted cubic spline with 5 knots at the 5
th, 
27.5
th, 50
th, 72.5
th, and 95
th quantiles of energy intensity, as suggested by Harrell (2001).  
A restricted cubic spline has linear segments on either end, is connected by cubic 22 
 
segments in the middle, and is twice differentiable everywhere.  Given the high skewness 
of the data, we fit the spline in terms of the log of energy intensity. 
We present the results of the flexible regression specifications graphically in lieu 
of a table of regression coefficients because of the difficulty of interpreting the spline 
coefficients.
8  We focus our presentation in the paper on the 1986-1994 results.
9  Figures 
4 and 5 present the energy price elasticities from our domestic supply (production) and 
demand (consumption) regression models.  The horizontal axis shows the energy 
intensity as measured by the ratio of energy costs to the value of shipments (as in Figure 
3), with the 50
th and 95
th percentiles of the energy intensity distribution identified by 
vertical lines.  The domestic supply-energy price elasticities presented in Figure 4 reveal 
a clear trend in increasing sensitivity to electricity price changes for the most energy-
intensive industries.  The median industry, in terms of energy intensity, has an estimated 
elasticity of about -0.16, more than twice the estimate of -0.071 in the simple linear 
regression model (left half of Table 1), and a 95 percent confidence interval that does not 
include the estimate from the simple linear regression model.  The estimated elasticity at 
the 90
th percentile of the energy intensity distribution is about -0.35, roughly five times 
the value estimates in the simple linear regression model.   
  Interestingly, a similar, but vertically shifted pattern is evident in the demand 
(consumption) results presented in Figure 5.  Ten of the least energy-intensive industries, 
representing about 2 percent of the manufacturing sector, experience a statistically 
significant and positive impact from an increase in energy prices based on these 
                                                   
8 A table of regression coefficients is available from the authors upon request. 
9 Figures for the 1974-1985 period and for specifications that do not distinguish between two periods 
within the 1974-1994 period are available from the authors upon request.  These results look similar to the 
1986-1994 period for supply and demand, with slight vertical shifts, but unlike the 1986-1994 period show 
no statistically significant effects of electricity prices on net imports at higher energy intensities.   23 
 
estimates, but 98 percent of industries experience a statistically insignificant or a negative 
change.  This is consistent with a substitution effect into less energy-intensive goods.  
The median industry does not experience a change in demand that is statistically different 
from zero.  The magnitude of the demand elasticity increases substantially again for the 
more energy-intensive industries.  The estimated elasticity at the 90
th percentile of the 
energy intensity distribution is about -0.25, with the upper end of the distribution 
approaching -0.4.  These two figures show that demand and domestic supply both decline 
with higher energy prices for the most energy-intensive firms, but that the demand 
response is less than the domestic supply response, suggesting some increase in net 
imports when energy prices increase. 
  Figure 6 shows this more precisely, that is, the net import impact (demand minus 
supply elasticity) of an energy price increase (the difference between Figures 4 and 5).  
Here, a 10 percent energy price increase would result in a 1 to 1.5 percent increase in net 
imports for most manufacturing industries, with some ranging below 1 percent and some, 
particularly those with energy intensity above 10 percent, exceeding 1.5 percent.  As 
noted previously, the 95
th percentile confidence interval presented in the figure reflects 
the correlation in the residuals of the supply and demand regression equations that are 
accounted for in our seemingly unrelated regression modeling framework.   
  In the previous section, we discussed the fact that measuring the net import effect 
as the difference between the demand and supply elasticities can misrepresent the true 
effect when net imports are a substantial fraction of domestic supply.  Correcting this is 
straightforward, but requires us to look at individual industries and their particular ratio 24 
 
of net imports to domestic supply.  We now turn to that calculation in the context of a 
proposed CO2 mitigation policy. 
   
V. Simulation of Near-term Effects of a CO2 Mitigation Policy 
  We can use these statistically-estimated relationships to simulate the effects of a 
$15 per ton CO2 price from a unilateral U.S. climate change policy.  Based on the Energy 
Information Administration (2008) modeling of an economy-wide cap-and-trade 
program, such an allowance price would increase industrial sector electricity prices by 
about 8 percent, which is approximately equal to a one standard deviation increase in 
energy prices in our sample.
10  This carbon price is similar to allowance prices expected 
at the start of cap-and-trade programs proposed in recent legislation, including EPA‟s 
(2009) estimate of a $13 per ton CO2 price under the Waxman-Markey Bill (H.R. 2454, 
111
th Congress), EPA‟s (2010) estimate of a $17 per ton CO2 price under the American 
Power Act (draft legislation from Senators Kerry and Lieberman) as well as the first year 
carbon tax of $15 per ton CO2 in a 2009 Republican-sponsored carbon tax bill (H.R. 
2380, 111
th Congress).
11  Based on these estimated model parameters, this energy price 
increase then drives the domestic supply, demand, and competitiveness impacts in our 
simulation.   
  Approximating     
   
      
    
    
    
   , Figure 7 presents the estimated 
competitiveness effects of a carbon pricing policy that raised energy prices reflecting $15 
                                                   
10 Extrapolating impacts for higher CO2 prices is beyond the scope of this analysis since it would reflect an 
out-of-sample prediction. 
11 The simulation focuses only on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels.  Since this represents 98 
percent of all carbon dioxide emissions, and more than 80 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States, this should serve as a sufficient simulation of the impact of climate policy on U.S. 
manufacturing industries competitiveness.  The key exception may be the cement industry, which has 
substantial process emissions of carbon dioxide. 25 
 
per ton CO2 as it varies with energy intensity; it is exactly a rescaled version of Figure 6.  
The competitiveness effect is on the order of about 1 percent but rises to more than 1.5 
percent for the most energy intensive industries.  This effect, however, is approximate 
because it ignores the term  
  
   
      
    in Equation (10). 
  Table 2 shows the corrected results in the context for all manufacturing and for 
specific sectors of the most energy-intensive industries, with the results weighted by 
industry-specific value of shipments (Column 5).
 12  This table also provides the 
approximated competitiveness impacts from Figure 7 for comparison (Column 4), which 
we can see are quite close.   The energy-intensive industries of iron and steel, aluminum, 
pulp and paper, cement, glass, and industrial chemicals would bear total percentage 
declines in domestic supply, on the order of -3.2 to -4.4 percent, in considerable excess of 
the manufacturing sector average of -1.4 percent (Column 2).  Most of the lower 
domestic supply reflects lower demand, however, not an influx of net imports; the 
demand declines range from about -1.9 to -2.8 percent.  Correcting for the relative size of 
supply and demand, the competitiveness effect is only 1.0 to 1.3 percent.  That is, in these 
industries about one-third of the decline in domestic supply results from an increase in 
net imports.  Even more narrowly defined industries could experience competitiveness 
impacts outside this range.    The largest impact among energy-intensive industries in our 
simulation is alkalies and chlorine, a subset of chemicals, with an estimated 
competitiveness effect of 2.2 percent.   
                                                   
12 In constructing the group aggregates, we estimate each of the component-industry percentage change 
based on that industry‟s energy intensity, and then add up these changes based on the component-industry‟s 
share of domestic supply within the industry group. 26 
 
Some non-energy intensive industries experienced larger impacts where domestic 
consumption is much greater than domestic supply, and where domestic demand rises 
from a substitution effect.  For example, both dolls and leather-lined clothing have effects 
above 3 percent.  This suggests an interesting phenomenon: among the energy-intensive 
industries that remain in the United States, they may be somewhat more resilient to 
higher energy prices than less energy-intensive industries that compete with large 
volumes of net imports. 
Given the empirical model‟s structure that yields common supply and demand 
elasticities with respect to energy prices for all industries with a comparable energy 
intensity, the simulation produces similar outcomes for industries with a similar energy 
intensity.  Therefore, we cannot rule out that some individual industries with a particular 
energy intensity may face a larger or smaller impact than the average that we calculate. 
 
VI. Policy Implications and Further Research 
  These results suggest that consumers of energy-intensive goods do not respond to 
higher energy prices by consuming a lot more imports.  To a large part, they economize 
on their use of these higher-priced manufactured goods, perhaps by using less of the good 
in the manufacture of their finished products or by substituting with other, less energy-
intensive materials.  Consumers appear to pursue only a limited substitution with imports, 
suggesting that the imported versions of domestically-produced goods may be imperfect 
substitutes.  Other determinants of trade flows – such as transport costs, tariffs, etc. – may 
limit the substitution possibilities.  Quantitatively, competitiveness effects are small in 
the sense that they amount for around 1 percent of supply even among energy-intensive 27 
 
industries.  A 1 percent change in supply due to carbon pricing induced competitiveness 
impacts is small relative to annual fluctuations in supply that average 6 to 10 percent for 
energy-intensive industries.  Compared to the overall effect on supply from proposed 
policies, this still counts for roughly one-third of the supply effect among energy-
intensive domestic suppliers; in fact, it accounts for a larger portion among some non-
energy-intensive industries.  This appears to reflect a substitution across goods, from 
energy-intensive to non-energy-intensive, and then to non-energy-intensive imports, 
rather than from energy-intensive domestic production to energy-intensive imports. 
Based on our findings, attempting to “protect” energy-intensive U.S. 
manufacturing firms from international competitive pressures through various policies 
may have only a limited impact on these firms.  The estimated competitiveness impacts, 
while fairly modest at $15 per ton CO2, suggest the need to target policies to those most 
likely to face adverse impacts, such as some narrowly defined industries that may face 
competitive pressures from abroad as their energy costs rise with a greenhouse gas 
mitigation policy. Indeed, given the modest magnitude of the competitiveness impacts on 
climate policy in our simulation, the potential economic and diplomatic costs of such 
policies may outweigh the benefits and commend no action.   
  Regardless, energy-intensive firms operating under the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme, a CO2 cap-and-trade program, have lobbied extensively to receive free 
allowances in the post-2012 ETS.  Similar firms in the U.S. have echoed this request as 
they have lobbied Congress during its deliberations of a U.S. cap-and-trade program in 
2009 and 2010 (see Interagency Competitiveness Analysis Team 2009).  The estimated 
competitiveness impacts in this analysis could provide a basis for the amount of the gratis 28 
 
allowance allocation necessary to offset output losses associated with a reduced 
competitive position under climate policy.  For example, if primary aluminum production 
declines 1.2 percent through competitiveness impacts (see Table 2), then the government 
could grant free allowances equal in value to 1.2 percent of their output in order to secure 
broader political support for the cap-and-trade program.
13   
There are limitations to these estimates.  First, given the historical experience 
represented in the data used to estimate our model, we cannot simulate the impacts of 
significantly higher CO2 prices.
14  Second, our estimates represent near-term impacts 
over one (or perhaps a few years).    Arguably with more time to adjust, U.S. industry 
could fare better (if they can reduce energy usage) or worse (if they have more time to 
move operations).  Third, even with our disaggregated data and flexible model, we still 
cannot flexibly capture all of the features relevant for every industry in every 
international trading situation.  The effects for some firms and sectors could be different 
than what we have estimated.  Fourth, in using historical data, we are necessarily 
assuming the past is a useful guide to future behavior.  To the extent there have been or 
will be substantial institutional changes, this assumption is flawed.   
Additional research can further inform our understanding of the competitiveness 
effects of climate policy.  First, the EU implemented in 2005 a CO2 cap-and-trade 
program covering the most energy-intensive manufacturing firms and the utility sector.  
                                                   
13 This is analogous to Goulder‟s (2001) work showing the magnitude of free allowances necessary to fully 
compensate firms for the costs of climate policy.  Our estimates would represent a fraction of Goulder‟s 
since these would only offset losses associated with increased net imports and not the direct costs of 
modifying capital to mitigate emissions.  And, while such an allocation might address distributional impact, 
it will not avoid the underlying problem of some emissions reductions in the United States being thwarted 
by shifts in production overseas. 
14 It is important to note that our analysis identifies the effect of energy prices on impact and 
competitiveness measures after controlling for economy-wide factors.  It is the residual variation after 
accounting for economy-wide energy price shocks that drives our results. 29 
 
A similar analysis could be undertaken (at the 2-digit ISIC level) of the manufacturing 
sector in Europe and the simulated results could be compared with realized outcomes 
under the EU ETS.  Second, as emission-intensive firms shed some capital and labor 
under climate policy, emission-lean firms may benefit by absorbing some of these 
factors.  While some proponents of climate policy have made anecdotal claims about 
economic winners under CO2 regulation, a rigorous econometric analysis of industries in 
and beyond manufacturing could explore whether the general equilibrium capital and 
labor effects dominate the modest burdens emission-lean firms bear under climate policy.  
It may be especially interesting to also consider how a sectoral (as opposed to economy-
wide) emission mitigation policy affects the allocation of capital and labor in the U.S. 
economy among regulated and non-regulated sectors.  This could complement one of the 
main findings of this work that the majority of the decline in domestic manufacturing 
production results from declines in domestic consumption. 30 
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Tables 
Table 1. Supply and Demand Regressions, Simple Models  
Variable  Supply  Demand  Demand – 
Supply 
Supply  Demand  Demand – 
Supply 
             
ln(Pelect)1974-1985  –0.112** 
(0.029) 
–0.163** 
(0.029) 
-0.051** 
(0.015) 
-0.045 
(0.030) 
-0.097** 
(0.030) 
-0.051** 
(0.016) 
ln(Pelect)1974-1985 ×  
  (avg energy inten) 1974-1985 
   
  -1.513** 
(0.18) 
-1.566** 
(0.19) 
-0.052 
(0.090) 
ln(Pelect) 1986-1994  -0.071* 
(0.034) 
0.068* 
(0.034) 
0.140** 
(0.017) 
-0.111** 
(0.036) 
0.033 
(0.035) 
0.145** 
(0.019) 
ln(Pelect) 1986-1994 ×  
  (avg energy inten) 1986-1994 
   
  -2.434** 
(0.21) 
-2.421** 
(0.22) 
0.013 
(0.115) 
tariff  
(average rate) 
–0.0071** 
(0.0013) 
–0.0106** 
(0.0013) 
  -0.0066** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0101** 
(0.0013) 
 
physical capital  0.22* 
(0.10) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
  0.23* 
(0.10) 
0.21* 
(0.10) 
 
human capital  0.23 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
  0.31** 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.11) 
 
R
2  0.967  0.963    0.968  0.963   
number of industries  430  430    430  430   
total observations  8,597  8,597    8,597  8,597   
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors presented in parentheses.  **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
Regressions also include year and industry fixed effects.  Standard errors associated with (supply – demand) account for correlation across 
equations. 35 
 
Table 2. Predicted impacts of a $15/ton CO2 price on various manufacturing sectors 
 
Industry 
(1) 
Energy 
intensity 
(2) 
Domestic 
Supply 
(3) 
Demand 
(4) 
Demand -  
Supply 
(5) 
Corrected 
Comp. 
Effect 
(6) 
CE as 
share of 
Supply 
Chemicals  0.11  -3.4  -2.2  1.2  1.3  0.37 
Paper  0.08  -3.2  -2.1  1.1  1.0  0.32 
Iron and 
Steel 
0.07  -3.0  -1.9  1.0  1.0  0.34 
Aluminum  0.24  -4.4  -2.8  1.6  1.2  0.28 
Cement  0.20  -4.2  -2.7  1.5  1.3  0.32 
Bulk Glass  0.08  -3.2  -2.1  1.1  1.2  0.38 
Industry 
average 
0.02  -1.4  -0.4  1.0  1.0  0.73 
Notes:  
1.  Columns (2) and (3) reflect estimated elasticities from Figures 4 and 5 based on the 
energy intensity in Column (1) (measured over 1985-1994 for each industry).   
2.  Corrected competitiveness effect reflects the adjustment in Equation (11); namely, adding 
(NI/S) × (demand effect in Column 2) to the measured “demand – supply” effect in 
Column (4).  NI/S ranges from about 3 percent for steel and chemicals to 12 percent for 
aluminum, so the correction tends to be small for these industries.   
3.  Column (6) shows the competitiveness effect (5) as a share of the overall supply effect 
(2).   
4.  Chemicals includes industrial inorganic chemicals, SIC codes 2812-2819.  Paper includes 
pulp, paper, and paperboard mills, SIC codes 2611, 2621, and 2631.  Iron and steel 
includes SIC codes 3312, 3321-3325.  Aluminum includes primary production, SIC code 
3334.  Cement includes hydraulic cement, SIC code 3241.  Bulk glass includes flat glass, 
SIC code 3211. 
5.  The $15/ton effect is translated into an 8% increase in electricity prices predicted under a 
carbon pricing policy in EIA (2008).   
6.  For multi-industry aggregates, results are weighted by the average value of shipments 
(1985-1994) among constituent 4-digit SIC industries.   
7.  Due to rounding, the values in Column (4) may not exactly equal the apparent difference 
in Columns (2) and (3).36 
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Figure 1: Effect of global carbon regulation on domestic price, domestic supply, and net imports 
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Figure 2. Effect of U.S.-only regulation on domestic price, domestic supply, and net imports 
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Figure 3. Distribution of 400+ industry classifications by energy intensity  
 
Notes: The vertical lines present the 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the manufacturing sector 
energy intensity distribution.   
Source: Constructed by authors from Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
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Figure 4. Estimated domestic supply-energy price elasticities as a function of energy 
intensity, 1986-1994 
 
Notes: The vertical lines present the 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the manufacturing sector 
energy intensity distribution.  The dashed lines present the 95 percent confidence interval. 
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Figure 5. Estimated demand-energy price elasticities as a function of energy intensity, 
1986-1994 
 
Notes: The vertical lines present the 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the manufacturing sector 
energy intensity distribution.  The dashed lines present the 95 percent confidence interval. 
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
Energy Intensity (1986-1994)  41 
Figure 6. Approximate competitiveness effect / estimated (demand – supply)-energy 
price elasticities as a function of energy intensity, 1986-1994 
 
Notes: The vertical lines present the 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the manufacturing sector 
energy intensity distribution.  The dashed lines present the 95 percent confidence interval.
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 Figure 7. Simulated competitiveness effects of a $15 per ton CO2 price, based on 1986-
1994 model   
 
Notes: The vertical lines present the 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the manufacturing sector 
energy intensity distribution.  The dashed lines present the 95 percent confidence interval. 
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